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Introduction  
At the heart of public policy theory is the idea that most of the action happens in well-established 
policy subsystems. Subsystems are the networks that actors form or operate within, to interact 
and coordinate actions with each other to influence the design of policy solutions. In most cases, 
influential policy theories have generated insights from mature subsystems, in which we can 
identify three crucial aspects relatively easily: the key participants, the territorial boundary 
(including the most relevant policymaking venues), and the substantive topic. For example, 
multiple streams analysis identifies the need for policy solutions to be deemed technically and 
politically feasible by a well-established policy community (Kingdon 1984), punctuated 
equilibrium theory establishes the role of shared beliefs in establishing (or challenging) policy 
monopolies in key policymaking venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), and the advocacy 
coalition framework identifies the role of ‘shocks’ to help explain the rise and fall of coalitions 
dominating a subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007b; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
However, by focusing only on mature subsystems, we miss an important piece of the 
puzzle: we do not know how and why particular subsystems form. Specifically, we do not know 
how actors begin to agree with each other to support the same policy design, before they decide 
to cooperate regularly to secure shared policy beliefs and preferences. This agreement upon 
policy design is an important pre-condition for successful policymaking and implementation 
(Ansell and Gash 2008). 
Studies of mature subsystems show that actors tend to coordinate actions based on 
ideological positions or power structures, depending on the degree of conflict or the level of 
decision-making, respectively (Fischer and Sciarini 2015a; Calanni et al. 2014; Ingold and 
Fischer 2014; Schneider et al. 2003). The scarce literature on nascent subsystems does not 
describe with such certainty how actors organize, interact and agree, partly because actors’ policy 
beliefs are not well established when dealing with new issues (Beverwijk et al. 2008; Stritch 
2015). In such situations, the identification of coalition partners is a challenging task to policy 
actors, and understanding actors’ behavior in these situations is a challenge to researchers. 
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To help solve this puzzle, we explain the dynamics of nascent subsystems within the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework. More concretely, we identify ways to measure activity at the 
early stage of policy action, to track the development of policy agreement. We ask: which drivers 
shape actors’ agreement in nascent policy subsystems? We examine three sets of hypotheses, 
testing their general application but also exploring differences across institutional and policy-
related contexts. The first investigates whether actors agree on policy design when they see the 
world through similar lenses. The second examines the role of actors’ reputations as leaders: 
some follow the lead of actors with decision-making or scientific authority (Fischer and Sciarini 
2015a; Calanni et al. 2014; Ingold and Fischer 2014; Schneider et al. 2003). Our third set of 
hypotheses claims that initial agreement on policy design is built on mutual knowledge. We use 
this phrase as a shorthand, describing what happens when actors know each other, and have built 
up knowledge of each other’s actions, which might prompt them to, for example, trust each other 
to act responsibly, predictably, or in accordance with shared aims.  Empirically, we investigate 
policy agreement in three different nascent subsystems concerning the issue of hydraulic 
fracturing regulation in two different institutional contexts, that is, consensual Switzerland and 
the majoritarian United Kingdom (UK) (see Cairney et al. 2016a on subsystems in such 
contrasting democracies). The comparison allows us to examine the extent to which we can 
confirm or refute the outlined hypotheses generally, or if they apply more or less strongly in 
different institutional settings.  
After hydraulic fracturing caused a gas boom in the United States, these new methods of 
unconventional gas development were discussed and tested in Europe. Hydraulic fracturing is a 
contested issue in societal, scientific and political debates in many European countries, but only 
very few projects of hydraulic fracturing are in an advanced state (Weible et al. 2016). Scientific 
research discusses the environmental risks of fracking and its impact on natural resources, 
ecosystems and human health, as well as the potential economical and geo-political risks and 
benefits for countries and regions (Wagner 2015; Stevens 2010). Policy actors are specialized in 
the specific issue of hydraulic fracturing to different degrees, and they defend diverging views 
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with respect to the benefits and risks related to unconventional gas development (Lachapelle et 
al. 2014). Based on the potential but uncertain harms to humans and the environment, civil 
society and green NGOs are strongly opposed to fracking. Private sector representatives and 
some local governments point towards its potential economic benefits and therefore favor limited 
regulation of the issue, but specific drilling sites also tend to face high opposition from local 
populations. As a consequence, only few clear regulations exist, and policy outputs are not final 
in many cases. They might take a different shape than traditional state interventions regarding 
energy or natural resource policy, and it is still unclear on which level appropriate legislation 
should happen. Given the relatively few policy outputs and organized advocacy on one side, and 
the high potential of political conflict and new specialized policies on the other, we argue that 
hydraulic fracturing is an ideal case to study policy agreement at a nascent stage.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. First, we demonstrate the importance 
of nascent subsystems to theories of the policy process. Policy scholars provide only partial 
explanation if they focus solely on mature subsystems. Second, we provide three actor-centered 
hypotheses on potential drivers of policy agreement: shared beliefs, leadership, and mutual 
knowledge. Third, we provide new data, and innovative analysis – using the Exponential Random 
Graph Model – to explain developments in real time in the UK and two Cantons in Switzerland. 
We find clear evidence that, when dealing with new issues, actors rely far more on former 
contacts than shared ideologies or leadership. 
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Theory 
We apply insights from the ACF, but note that the issues we raise apply more generally to policy 
theory. Most policy theories – such as multiple streams analysis (MSA), punctuated equilibrium 
theory (PET) and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) – identify the logic of interactions in 
mature subsystems. MSA examines the dynamic between three separate ‘streams’: lurches of 
attention to policy problems; the development of feasible solutions, and the motivation and 
opportunity of policymakers to adopt a particular solution (Kingdon 1984; Cairney and Jones 
2016; Zahariadis 2014; Jones et al. 2016). Although many people act independently to secure 
government attention to a problem, the processing of feasible solutions is more limited to the 
experienced and well-connected policy entrepreneurs that look for the right time to propose them, 
such as when they detect a high level of agreement about how to frame and solve a problem, and 
the well-established policy community which helps ‘soften’ or modify a proposal, to increase its 
technical and political feasibility and chances of success.  
An important initial emphasis of PET was on the role of agreement in the establishment 
of policy monopolies in key venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Baumgartner et al. 2014). A ‘monopoly of understandings’ referred to high levels of agreement 
among a select group of policymakers, regulators, congressional, and private actors, about the 
nature of the policy problem and the best solution. Actors in disagreement with this policy 
settlement often needed to cooperate to generate external attention and shift policymaking 
responsibility to an alternative venue.  
At the heart of ACF explanation of minor policy change is the role of policy learning 
within an advocacy coalition which tends to dominate debate and have the most influence on 
policy. Major policy change is rare, and linked to the role of ‘shocks’ to help explain the rise and 
fall of dominant coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007a).  It is 
possible to trace back these events to the ways in which actors form coalitions with others sharing 
similar beliefs, worldviews and ideas on how to best solve a problem. Coalition allies then 
coordinate action and engage in strategies such as venue shopping or the activation of veto points 
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(Fischer 2014; Tsebelis 1995; Nohrstedt and Olofsson 2016), and agreement upon beliefs and 
policy preferences within coalitions is reinforced when they see opponents as more powerful and 
evil than they really are (Fischer et al. 2016; Sabatier et al. 1987).  
With each theory, we can conclude that the appearance of advocacy coalitions, issue 
framing, successful venue exploitation, or entrepreneurship is the result of long-term 
developments and established patterns of agreement and disagreement in policy subsystems. It 
is possible to trace back these developments, but most studies tend not to do so; or, in 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) original case studies, they rely on documentary and data analysis 
of events and agreements formed decades before.  
In each case, most studies miss the chance to (1) assess early stages of actors’ 
coordination, such as the agreement on policy design; and (2) track the levels of such agreement 
in real time: before actors engage systematically, subsystems mature, and action is influenced 
heavily by path dependence and former interactions on the same issue. When studying nascent 
subsystems as they develop, we have the chance to investigate the pre-conditions for more 
established relationships among actors formulating and implementing policies. To do so, our 
study relies on concepts and elements of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The dependent 
variable is agreement upon policy design. Following the ACF’s belief hierarchy (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993), this corresponds to agreement on the level of secondary aspects, that is, on 
how an issue is to be regulated, and what instruments are needed to tackle a given problem.  
 
Actors dealing with new issues 
New issues arise on the policy agenda following, for example, the development of new 
technology. New issues on the political agenda are characterized by what Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1999) call “little history of policy solutions or outputs, little advocacy activity, and little 
public and decision-making attention.” New issues on the agenda potentially prompt a series of 
steps: first, actors consider their position on a given issue and identify the actors which might 
agree with them about the best way to respond. At this stage, beliefs of actors are only vaguely 
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formulated (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) or fragmented (Beverwijk et al. 2008), even 
though actors might have already formulated their policy positions on similar or related issues 
earlier. Further, when a subsystem transcends from a nascent to a mature stage, actors start to 
have some degree of specialization in the specific policy area (see Henry et al. 2014). Second, 
some actors discuss how to cooperate to influence policy. Third, some engage together to try to 
influence policy in at least one significant venue. These actions produce reactions. Actors who 
do not share the same beliefs engage in the same venues to counter their influence. They begin 
to form alliances with other actors which seem to share their aims or beliefs. In turn, there is a 
reinforcing effect: when each set of actors witnesses the other engaging in coordinated action, it 
prompts them to mobilise and cooperate with each other. As this activity increases so too does 
contact with policymakers: subsystems develop when early ad hoc activity becomes more 
systematic engagement with policymakers in dedicated venues or meetings. This corresponds to 
a move from so-called advocacy communities with some ideological and coordinative 
congruence (see Stritch 2015), to “real” advocacy coalitions sharing beliefs and coordination 
patterns (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).  In such a context of a nascent subsystem, achieving 
agreement on policy design might be conceived as one first step towards coalition formation. 
Below, we formulate three sets of hypotheses on potential drivers of actors’ policy agreement in 
such nascent subsystems. 
 
Drivers for agreement in policy networks  
The fact that an actor perceives agreement with another actor can be defined as a directed relation 
between two actors integrated in a larger policy network. Network interactions are driven by 
actors’ individual attributes and behavior, but are also embedded within a larger, exogenous 
institutional framework (Fischer et al. 2012; Ingold and Leifeld 2014; Gerber et al. 2013; Lubell 
et al. 2012). To understand policy agreement between actors in a nascent subsystem, we focus 
mainly on micro-level drivers, including variables at the actors’ level and at the level of actors’ 
ties. 
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We identify, from the literature on mature subsystems, the factors most likely to impact 
policy agreement (see below). Most often, the aim of studies focusing on belief homophily, 
leadership, or mutual knowledge was to understand an advanced form of within-coalition 
coordination such as collaboration among political actors. Still, homophily, leadership, or mutual 
knowledge should also matter when actors engage in early coordination in a nascent situation, 
that is when establishing policy agreement. We thus test if these drivers are also present at a 
nascent stage of policy development.  
 
Belief and level homophily: seeing the world through similar lenses 
First, policy network studies point strongly to phenomena of homophily (Gerber et al. 2013). 
Homophily refers to the fact that two actors which are similar with respect to some attribute 
create a relationship (Mcpherson et al. 2001; Calanni et al. 2014). With respect to policy 
agreement, actors are often similarly affected by a political problem and they see the policy 
problem through the same lenses. They tend to develop a common understanding of the problem, 
and might even engage in joint learning processes (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Feiock 2009; 
Lubell et al. 2009). We thus expect homophily to foster policy agreement, and we take into 
account two types: ideological and level homophily.  
Ideological homophily refers to the fact that actors with similar policy core beliefs, or 
actors being similarly affected by potential policy change, tend to prefer the same policy design 
and instruments for the regulation of a given issue. The ACF (Sabatier 1987; Jenkins-Smith et 
al. 2014) focuses on shared beliefs and argues that actors in a policy process form coalitions 
based on similar beliefs that can range from fundamental values to favoring the same policy 
instruments. The causal mechanism we are investigating implies that core beliefs influence the 
preferences for measures and instruments to tackle a specific problem. Whereas coalition 
formation based on shared beliefs is a well-studied phenomenon in mature subsystems, we expect 
beliefs to matter also in nascent subsystems, and for an early stage of coordinated action such as 
policy agreement. We thus assume that in nascent subsystems actors tend to agree upon policy 
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design with actors who share a similar ideology. For example, organizations that are similarly 
affected or threatened by potential policy change tend to agree on policies (Ingold and Metz 
2015; Heikkila and Weible 2016).  
Further, issues of environmental and energy policy, such as hydraulic fracturing, mostly 
pitch actors with right-wing and economy-friendly core beliefs against left-wing and 
environmental actors (Ingold 2011; Kriesi and Jegen 2001; Montpetit et al. 2016; Ingold and 
Fischer 2014)i. Whereas the first favor values of economic efficiency and free market, the latter 
support state intervention to defend the environment. Based on this, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Actors with similar core beliefs tend to agree on policy design in a given 
policy process.  
Level homophily concerns the level of decision-making in a multi-level political system. 
In most political systems, competences are shared between central and regional or subnational 
levels. For example, in hydraulic fracturing in the UK, the central level is responsible for the 
general regulation of the issue, but whether hydraulic fracturing actually happens depends 
strongly on the devolved (Scotland, Wales, Northern) levels, responsible for land planning, and 
local levels, where concrete drilling projects have to be implemented and might confront local 
resistance. In Switzerland, the regional level is responsible for drilling permits, whereas the 
central level regulates the environmental standards which need to be respected. Given these 
different aspects of the policy treated at each level, we expect homophily effects to take place. In 
multi-level political systems, belonging to the same level of decision-making fosters a common 
understanding of the problem, collective action and joint learning processes (Berardo and Scholz 
2010; Feiock 2009; Lubell et al. 2009). This joint understanding of the problem through a level-
specific lens may contribute to policy agreement: 
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Hypothesis 1b: Actors belonging to the same level of decision-making tend to agree on 
policy design in a given policy process. 
 
Authority and knowledge: follow the leader 
In situations when a new issue enters the agenda or a subsystem is in its nascent stage, actors 
seek information (Klein et al. 1999; Leach et al. 2014). They refer to other actors who they deem 
knowledgeable, and tend to adopt their policy positions. We distinguish two types of actors which 
should most often act as “opinion leaders” or “reference actors”, that is, actors generally 
perceived as scientific experts or powerful actors.  
In a policy sector where empirical or academic evidence of human effects on the 
environment are still lacking, scientific knowledge is an important resource in policymaking. 
Actors need information about the problem and the likely effects of different policy designs on 
target groups. This allows them to justify their own beliefs and to know why one policy design 
might be most suitable to solve a problem. Scientific actors and think tanks are generally the 
main providers of “objective” or technical knowledge (Leifeld and Schneider 2012). Actors are 
thus expected to agree with the policy positions of scientific actors.  
Hypothesis 2a: Actors tend to agree with scientific actors on policy design in a given policy 
process.  
 
Calanni et al. (2014) show that power is an important factor shaping relations among actors 
in collaborative subsystems. Actors with a high reputation for policy influence are role models 
to others: powerful actors, whether formal decision-makers or structurally well embedded actors 
(Ingold and Leifeld 2014; Fischer and Sciarini 2015a), have an important impact on policy 
outputs (Choi and Robertson 2014; Henry 2011). Given their influential position, they are also 
credible knowledge providers regarding policy design and which levels of policy-making should 
tackle an issue. Thus, political actors are expected to agree with powerful actors  
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Hypothesis 2b: Actors tend to agree with influential actors on policy design in a given 
policy process. 
 
Former collaboration and joint venues: The role of mutual knowledge 
Political actors may rely on actors they know from former policy processes. Policy network 
scholars emphasize the role of trust and mutual knowledge (Berardo 2009; Cook et al. 2005; 
Leach and Sabatier 2005; Lubell 2007) as well as venues and institutional opportunity structures 
(Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Fischer and Sciarini 2015a) for policymaking. We take into account 
two factors which contribute to mutual knowledge between actors, and provide them with 
opportunities to find an agreement on their policy positions: actors can develop mutual 
knowledge and a joint understanding of how to best solve a problem from former collaboration 
in other policy processes (Ingold and Metz 2015); and, venues of the policy process create 
institutional opportunity structures for actors to develop contacts (Leifeld and Schneider 2012; 
Williamson 1991; Sabatier and Weible 2007a). Joint participation in venues, such as consultation 
procedures or working groups, facilitate communication and allows actors find agreement on 
their policy positions.  
Hypothesis 3a: Two actors who have collaborated before tend to agree on policy design 
in a given policy process.  
Hypothesis 3b: Two actors participating in the same venues tend to agree on policy design 
in a given policy process. 
 
Cases  
We focus on a new issue on the political agenda: the exploitation of unconventional gas resources 
using the technology of hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’). Some might consider the whole issue 
as ‘semi-new’ since energy companies have engaged in unconventional means to access minerals 
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for decades. Further, there are policy subsystems very closely related to unconventional gas 
exploitation where actors already have well-established beliefs and shared action among each 
other. Such related areas might include energy production, fossil fuels, and climate change.  
Yet, fracking should be considered as an analytically distinct and nascent subsystem for the 
following reasons:  first, there are almost no final policy outputs. For instance in the Swiss case, 
forms of state intervention are discussed (such as introducing fracking moratoriums or bans), but 
there is no final decision, or the final decision was implicitly postponed (moratorium). 
Furthermore, and in both countries, the appropriate levels of decision-making are still under 
discussion: in the UK, decision-making concerning unconventional gas exploitation took place 
mostly at the national level, but some regional and local policymaking might still happen; in 
Switzerland, there is currently more regional than national activity.  
Second, in relation to the potential new policy outputs, beliefs (secondary aspects and policy core 
beliefs) are highly diverse and include, for instance, considerations about energy self-sufficiency 
or land use change, but also water or air quality issues related to the fracking liquids and 
horizontal drilling techniques (these issues are specific to unconventional gas development using 
hydraulic fracturing methods). Third, some actors have started to specialize in this policy area, 
including: green NGOs, neighborhood associations, and new administrative entities in the UK 
(FrackOff, No Hot Air, OUGO); and, key neighborhood associations in Switzerland  (Collectif 
Val-de-Travers; see section below and Appendix I for the actors’ lists).   
Our empirical analysis compares two sub-national entities in Switzerland (CH) and 
national policy-making in the UK. This case selection covers different institutional contexts and 
policy-making situations (see Table 1). First, in comparative politics, the UK most often 
represents the classic ‘Westminster model’, stressing the ‘majoritarian’ nature of policymaking; 
whereas Switzerland is an ideal-typical consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999). Second, the 
British government structure can be classified as unitary, whereas Switzerland is a federalist 
country where responsibilities are organized according to the subsidiarity principle in most policy 
sectors. Yet, in both countries, hydraulic fracturing regulations are produced in a multi-level 
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setting including the national as well as regional and local entities. In Swiss federalism, sub-
national authorities hold mineral rights and decisional power about gas resources. Cantons have 
the competence to distribute exploration, site development and exploitation concessions to third 
parties. The protection of drinking water and ecosystems is regulated by national law. 
Constructions potentially harming natural resources, ecosystems and the environment have to be 
evaluated by an Environmental Impact Assessment. This assessment is also one of the basic 
principles sub-national authorities use in their evaluation of a concession request. In the UK, 
central government shares responsibility for environmental policy with the EU, and delegates 
planning decisions to devolved and local governments (Cairney 2015; Cairney et al. 2016b). Still, 
the central state decides on the major elements of unconventional gas exploitation policies such 
as energy policy/security, taxation/mineral rights, and the license for private companies to drill. 
We thus cover countries where the main competence for regulation lies at the central level (UK) 
and at the regional level (CH). 
Third, there is a difference in the degree to which unconventional gas development is 
regulated in both countries, and between the two Swiss cases. Both Swiss cases represent very 
restrictive policy outputs (moratorium and ban). In the canton of Neuchâtel, a gas company had 
preliminary negotiations with the canton about a potential exploration concession. The planned 
drilling site in Val-de-Travers induced public opposition in the form of protestation rallies, public 
campaigns and parliamentary initiatives. As a consequence, a moratorium for ten years was 
installed in 2014 on all gas exploration and exploitation. In the canton of Bern, no concrete 
project of hydraulic fracturing is planned. Still, a parliamentary initiative asked for the opinion 
of the cantonal government on hydraulic fracturing. Further, the cantonal Green party and 
environmental organizations started a popular initiative to legally ban hydraulic fracturing in 
Bern. The initiative was successfully submitted in 2014. At the same time, a parliamentary 
motion asked the government to act, and the latter plans to introduce a ban in the next revision 
of the respective law.ii 
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The UK government has produced a series of decisions which can be interpreted as a 
tentative pro-fracking position (Decc 2012; Cairney et al. 2016b). It provides the conditions for 
private companies to decide how viable their projects are, when subject to government taxation, 
and planning and environmental regulations (White et al. 2014). Further, the central UK 
government promises tax breaks on capital investment and government compensation to local 
areas. Before being able to start a project, companies need to have licenses from DECC and 
multiple public bodies (such as the Environmental Agency) and planning consent from devolved 
and local areas. Several protest events at the local level complicate the implementation of planned 
projects. Overall, still, policy outputs rather point towards a more permissive and liberal solution 
in the UK, and more restrictive policies in Switzerland.  
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the cases under study. Our case selection 
allows us to investigate whether the specific dynamics of nascent subsystems are valid in 
different institutional and policy contexts.  If results from our analysis hold in all cases, we can 
be confident that the observed effects are at work independently of the specific institutional or 
policy-making context. If results differ between cases, this will be discussed in the light of the 
differences presented above. However, given that we are unable to control for all potential 
context differences, we refrain from formulating explicit hypotheses on the influence of these 
context conditions. 
Additionally, the last rows of Table 1 present the number of actors in the respective policy 
networks, and the average value of the dependent variable, i.e. policy agreement. It shows that 
on average, across all actor-actor dyads, policy agreement is highest in Neuchâtel and lowest in 
the UK (last line). 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Data and methods 
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For all three cases, data on dependent and independent variables stem from surveys sent 
electronically in summer (UK) and winter (Switzerland) 2014. Response rates were satisfactory, 
reaching 53% in the UK, 65% in Neuchâtel, and 48% in Bern. To identify survey partners, we 
first identified all relevant actors participating in the respective policy process. Instead of 
individuals, modern policymaking and policy design is shaped by collective actors and 
organizations (Knoke 1993; Laumann and Knoke 1987). Collective actors dispose of resources 
such as knowledge, money, personnel or information which allows them to impact decision-
making (Henning 2009; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996).  Based on the traditional combination of 
decisional, positional and reputational approaches (Knoke 1993), we created an actors’ list for 
each case. More specifically, we first identified actors holding formal competences in decision-
making on fracking regulation (positional), based on our knowledge of the respective political 
systems, and document analysis. Second, we identified the venues of the three decision-making 
processesiii and retained those actors who participated in these venues (decisional). Survey 
respondents were then asked to add additional relevant actors (reputational). Overall, 34 actors 
in the UK, 30 in Neuchâtel, and 23 in Bern were retained for analysis, representing private and 
public entities such as municipal representatives, administrative agencies, green NGOs, 
universities, or industry associations (for a full list of actors and actor types, please consult 
Supplementary Online Material, Appendix I).  
The dependent variable of our analysis consists of actors’ agreement on policy design 
regarding unconventional gas extraction through hydraulic fracturing. In the survey, we asked 
actors to indicate which other actors (from the list mentioned above) they agree or disagree with 
about policy measures to be taken for the regulation of unconventional gas development.iv In 
case actors did not know whether they agree or disagree with another actor, they indicated 
nothing. We used this data to create a network of policy agreement with values of 1 for the 
presence and of 0 for the absence of policy agreement (i.e. neutral relation o disagreement) 
between two actorsv.  
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Independent variables for testing hypotheses 1a and 1b are simple categorical variables for actors. 
We coded each actor according to different types. First, we attributed a level (national or 
regional) to each actor. Second, we coded left political parties and environmental groups as 
having left-green ideologies, whereas right-wing parties as well as business and industry 
representatives were coded as having right-economic beliefs. Third, for the test of hypothesis 2a, 
we coded actors as being scientific actors or not.  
The other independent variables stem from data gathered through our survey. First, to 
assess the power of actors (hypothesis 2b), we rely on the measure of reputational power (Knoke 
1996; Fischer and Sciarini 2015b). Based on the same list of actors as the dependent variable, we 
asked survey participants to indicate whether they consider the other actors on the list as being 
very important in decision-making on unconventional gas development (in which case we 
attributed a value of 1 to the respective actors). The power of an actor corresponds to the number 
of times an actor was mentioned as being powerful, over all answers. Given that reputational 
power is based on the average perception of all other actors in the respective decision-making 
process, it is supposed to encompass many different aspects and sources of power. Finally, 
drawing on the same list of actors, we asked survey partners to indicate with whom they strongly 
collaborated in other, former policy processes. This results in a network of actors where a tie (1) 
represents past collaboration, whereas the absence of a tie (0) represents no former collaboration.  
Second, we identified all venues and phases of the respective policy process under 
investigation. We asked survey participants to indicate which process venues their organization 
participated in. Based on this information, we created a 2-mode actor-venue matrix that was 
subsequently transformed in a valued one-mode actor-actor matrix, where the strength of a tie 
between two actors indicates in how many venues two actors jointly participated. We use these 
variables to test hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
 
Exponential random graph models (ERGM)  
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We estimate Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM, Robins et al. 2007) to evaluate the 
factors that account for policy agreement between two actors. With network data, such as our 
data on actors’ policy agreement, the usual assumption of statistical models on the independence 
of observations is inappropriate. The assumption that agreement between actors i and j is totally 
independent on other agreement ties that actors i or j have with other actors in the network is 
unrealistic. The probability that two actors agree rather depends, at least partly, upon the 
structural properties of the agreement network in which the two actors are embedded. Contrary 
to usual statistical models, ERGMs allow for statistical inference on network data (for 
applications in political science, see, e.g., Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Leifeld and Schneider 
2012; Gerber et al. 2013). Because error terms would be correlated across observations, standard 
regression models would erroneously attribute explanatory power to other independent variables, 
instead of attributing them to endogenous network structures (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; 
Leifeld and Schneider 2012).  
The dependent variable of an ERGM is the whole network as a one observation (Cranmer 
and Desmarais 2011). The whole dependent network is then modeled as a function of actor-level 
variables (node covariates), dyadic variables (edge covariates), and endogenous network 
structures. The latter refer to effects of network structures on the network itself. These effects are 
important to control for in any type of network model, as observations in a network are – per 
definition – non-independent from each other (see above). It is thus possible that a tie in a network 
is formed simply because of the existence of other adjacent ties. An example is  actors' tendency 
to reciprocate ties or to collaborate with actors to which they are already indirectly connected. 
Not taking endogenous network structures into account would lead to an overestimation of the 
weight of exogenous parameters, that is, node or edge covariates.  
An ERGM then calculates the probability of observing the network defined as dependent 
variable, over all the configurations that could exist in the network in question. Yet, given the 
very high number of possible network configurations, computing the exact maximum likelihood 
is impossible (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). ERGMs are therefore estimated based on Markov 
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Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCMC-MLE). MCMC-MLE approximates the exact 
likelihood as it relies on a sample of possible networks to estimate the parameters (Cranmer and 
Desmarais 2011).vi This iterative optimization proceeds until differences between the coefficients 
from the observed network and the average coefficients from the sample of simulated networks 
are no longer significant (p greater than 0.05) (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).  
 
Results 
Results from the Exponential Random Graph Models are presented in Table 2. Models for the 
three cases are the same, with two exceptions: given actors all belong to the central level in the 
UK case, we are unable to test hypothesis 1b on level homophily for the UK. As there is only 
one scientific actor in Bern and Neuchâtel, respectively, we refrain from including the respective 
variable and testing this hypothesis for the Swiss cases.vii  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
To control for endogenous network structures, we include a reciprocity parameter as well 
as two indicators (GWESP and GWDSP) which account for transitive triangular structures 
among actors. Reciprocity represents the situation when actor a indicates agreement with actor 
b, and actor b confirms agreement with actor a, independently of any exogenous node or edge 
covariates. In many types of networks, but more so in networks of policy agreement, one would 
expect to observe such effects of reciprocity. There is however no reciprocity present in the 
network of actors’ agreement on policy, which lends support to our basic claim that this is a new 
issue dealt with in a nascent subsystem, and that actors are uncertain with respect to the policy 
preferences of other actors. The interpretation of the transitive triangular structures further 
supports this view. The GWDSP (geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partner) captures the 
tendency of a pair of actors (collaborating or not) to have a shared collaboration partner 
(corresponding to either open or closed triangles), whereas the GWESP (geometrically weighted 
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edgewise shared partner) measures whether two actors that collaborate do have shared partners 
(corresponding to closed triangles).viii Both effects are only based on the network itself, that is, 
exogenous node or edge covariates do not play a role in these mechanisms. 
Joint assessment of the GWDSP (negative, i.e. negative tendency for any two actors to 
both agree with any third actor) and GWESP (positive, i.e. positive tendency for two actors who 
agree with a given third actor to also agree among themselves) parameters indicate the presence 
of transitivity in the network. As with the absence of reciprocity, this result suggests that the 
network of actors agreement on policies to deal with the new issue of hydraulic fracturing has a 
hierarchical structure, that is, network ties of policy agreement tend to point in one direction only. 
Actors appear to have a hard time recognizing the many different potential policy solutions, the 
respective preferences of their fellow actors, as well as their potential allies (Fink and Harms 
2012; Krishnan et al. 2006; Beverwijk et al. 2008).  
Ideological homophily matters in two out of three cases, and for left-green actors only. In 
the UK and Neuchâtel, actors with left-green beliefs agree on policies to address hydraulic 
fracturing. This is not the case in Bern. There is also no specific agreement between actors with 
right-economic ideologies. Actors with a right-conservative background and economic interests 
do not agree on policy measures to address hydraulic fracturing in any of the cases. There is also 
no tendency of actors to agree with others on their same level of decision-making. This 
hypothesis was tested for the cases in federalist Switzerland only, but the multi-level structure of 
the policy does not seem to play a role with respect to policy agreement among actors. 
Furthermore, we observe no specific effect with respect to scientific actors, but others tend to 
agree with powerful actors in the UK and Bern cases, but not in Neuchâtel. If actors collaborated 
in former policy processes on similar issues, they tend to agree on measures to address hydraulic 
fracturing. This effect appears in all three cases. Joint venue participation, however, leads to 
policy agreement only in the UK and in the canton of Neuchâtel, but not in the case of Bern.  
 
Discussion 
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Different types of homophily, leadership, and mutual knowledge have been shown to matter in 
mature subsystems, but is this is true in nascent subsystems? Our empirical analysis allows us to 
understand which factors could explain whether or not actors agree with respect to policy design 
in nascent subsystems. If results are not consistent across the three different institutional and 
policy contexts, this means that dynamics of actors’ agreement in nascent policy subsystems are 
not independent of the specific context. In this case, we aim to account for these differences by 
pointing to institutional and/or case-related differences.  
First, we hypothesized that actors with the same ideological core beliefs (left-green, right-
economic) or from the same decision-making level (regional or national) agree on policies to 
address hydraulic fracturing. First, there is only weak support for our hypothesis 1a on belief 
homophily. Only actors with the same left-green beliefs tend to agree on policy design, and this 
is true in two cases only. On closer inspection, it appears that the left-green actors mostly agree 
on their opposition to specific drilling projects. Left-green actors agree in the cases of the UK 
and the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel, but not in Bern. The lack of a concrete fracking project in the 
canton of Bern, as opposed to the other cases, could explain a lack of agreement on the left-green 
side of the political spectrum. Opposing a specific policy project is a rather simple type of 
agreement. Opposition to specific projects represents a one-dimensional preference. On the 
contrary, agreeing on more complex types of policy designs in a policy debate unrelated to a 
concrete project, as is the case of Bern, seems more complicated.  
Also, actors from the right realm and economic interests defend more fragmented and 
nuanced positions. First, while some of them want to allow or even promote projects of hydraulic 
fracturing, others are more skeptical. They are not explicitly in favor of hydraulic fracturing, 
recognize the potential risks for the environment and public health, and want to introduce 
legislation which takes these risks into account, but are against a ban or moratorium on the 
technology. Second, some firms dealing with conventional gas extraction are skeptical because 
they are afraid of getting affected by the negative image of hydraulic fracturing.ix Third, actors 
tentatively in favor of hydraulic fracturing potentially benefit from the former status quo, which 
21 
 
in all three cases does not explicitly ban the technology. Contrary to left-ecological interests, to 
actively fight for a moratorium or ban, the status quo policy (i.e. no ban, no moratorium) is closer 
to right-economic ideologies on this issue. The lack of right-economic ideological homophily is 
thus also due to the uncertainty of the respective actors on whether active engagement in a policy 
process was necessary to defend their preferences. Overall, although given the weak support, we 
tend to reject hypothesis 1b.  
Hypothesis 1b on level homophily could only be tested in the federalist setting of 
Switzerland, and has to be rejected. There is no homophily with respect to decision-making level, 
which means that the question of hydraulic fracturing does not give place to a conflict between 
decision-making levels in Switzerland.  
Second, we expected actors to agree with scientific actors, as well as actors with a high 
influence reputation. Hypothesis 2a on scientific actors has to be rejected, as there is no specific 
effect for scientific actors in the case of the UK. Indeed, also scientific research is affected by 
the fact that hydraulic fracturing is a relatively new issue, and scientists disagree among them on 
several issues (Wagner 2015; Stevens 2010). It seems that in nascent subsystems, scientific actors 
also suffer from uncertainties, and are thus not the opinion leaders one would expect based on 
their in-depth knowledge of a given issue. By contrast, we have evidence in support of hypothesis 
2b in two out of three cases. Powerful actors seem to act as opinion leaders in Bern as well as in 
the UK, but not in Neuchâtel. In this specific case, two of the most powerful actors were the 
cantonal government and the Department of Spatial Development and the Environment, which 
before the moratorium were negotiating with potentially interested firms. This hybrid position 
has probably led to a lack of confidence of other actors in these leading actors, and thus to 
disagreement with these powerful actors in the case of Neuchâtel.  
Third, model results support our hypotheses 3a and 3b based on arguments about actors’ 
mutual knowledge. If actors previously collaborated with each other in another policy process on 
similar issues, or if they participated in the same venues of the policy process, they agree on 
policies to regulate hydraulic fracturing.x Both factors allow actors to know about their mutual 
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positions, and thus to enhance knowledge with respect to the preferences of other actors. With 
the exception of the Bern case (where participating in the same venue has no significant effect), 
former collaboration and joint venue participation enhances policy agreement in all cases. Again, 
a specificity of the Bern case could account for the fact that joint venue participation does not 
matter in this process: contrary to the UK and the canton of Neuchâtel, there was no concrete 
project of gas extraction (using hydraulic fracturing) planned in Bern. Venues dealt mainly with 
political aspects, but no specific aspect of a concrete project were discussed. In such a situation 
it seems to be more complicated for actors to develop a policy agreement, especially in a nascent 
situation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated the drivers of actors’ agreement in nascent subsystems with respect to 
policy design related to the new issue of hydraulic fracturing. The literature outlines different 
drivers for actors’ interaction in well-developed policy subsystems, but not the factors 
influencing policy agreement in nascent situations. We argue that, especially in nascent 
subsystems, actors have a hard time to know who to agree with, given the fragmented or fluid 
nature of beliefs at this stage (Stritch 2015; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).  
Based on the literature on mature policy networks and subsystems, we analyzed whether 
homophily, leadership, and/or mutual knowledge were relevant drivers for actors’ policy 
agreement in nascent subsystems. To test these arguments, we investigated three cases, which 
differ according to the specific institutional and policy-related context: two sub-national units in 
consensual Switzerland and one national political decision-making process about hydraulic 
fracturing policies in the majoritarian UK. We examined our hypotheses based on results of 
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM). Our approach is novel as we do not study mature 
and consolidated, but nascent coordination among actors by assessing policy agreement. 
First, and independently of the hypotheses, the endogenous structure of the network of 
policy agreement supports the basic assumption that actors find it difficult to identify ideological 
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peers when dealing with new policy issues in nascent subsystems. They are unaware of other 
actors’ preferences on hydraulic fracturing politics. Ties of agreement point mainly in one 
direction, and are not reciprocated among actors.  
As hypothesized, actors’ agreement on policy design in nascent subsystems has unusual 
elements. While we tested factors which usually also matter in mature subsystems, results point 
towards specific effects in nascent situations. Whereas ideological homophily or power 
constellations shape actors’ interactions in mature subsystems (Fischer and Sciarini 2015a; 
Calanni et al. 2014; Ingold and Fischer 2014), trust and former contacts are most important in 
shaping the network of policy agreement in a nascent subsystem (see also Berardo 2009). The 
three cases confirm that in nascent subsystems, and when dealing with an issue which only 
recently entered the political agenda, actors’ policy preferences and beliefs are not yet well 
defined. Actors in all three cases, and mainly pro-economy representatives, were unsure about 
which other actors to agree with, with the exception of those actors they know from previous 
processes or venue co-participation. Instead of mature advocacy coalitions including like-minded 
members engaging in a non-trivial degree of within and across-coalition coordination (Henry 
2011; Sabatier and Weible 2005), nascent subsystems are influenced by “coalitions of 
convenience” (Cairney et al. 2016b) or “advocacy communities” (Stritch 2015). In such 
situations, actors show some policy agreement with others, but do not yet form stable coalitions 
with ideologically similar others.   
Differences between the three cases could mostly be attributed to the status of concrete 
drilling projects of hydraulic fracturing. We find no evidence that the larger institutional context, 
such as the type of democracy or the level of decision-making (Cairney et al. 2016a), have an 
influence on the variables which explain policy agreement on the micro-level between two actors. 
What does this mean for the design of policy processes in nascent subsystems? First, 
focusing on earlier processes, and adopting a long-term perspective on policy-making in a given 
subsystem or issue area, seems important. Second, providing political actors with opportunities 
to exchange ideas and get to know each other in venues such as roundtables or policy committees 
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seems to be beneficial to policy agreement and the formation of stable coalitions. Future research 
should thus shed further light on the causal mechanisms between such opportunities for actors to 
exchange and increase mutual knowledge, policy agreement (on the process level), and the 
timeline, efficiency and effectiveness of policy introduction (output level). This study consists 
of a first step in doing so, by focusing on early stage of actors’ coordination, assessing policy 
agreement in a nascent context.  
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Table 1: Institutional setting and policy outputs in Switzerland and the UK 
 UK Switzerland 
  Neuchâtel Bern 
Type of democracy 
 
Majoritarian Consensus 
Government 
structure 
 
Unitary Federalist 
Jurisdictional level 
dealing with 
hydraulic fracturing  
 
Central state, some 
competences at 
subnational levels 
Sub-national, some competences at central 
level 
Policy design 
regulation hydraulic 
fracturing 
No clear policy 
output, 
regional 
moratoriums 
Moratorium on 
conventional and 
unconventional 
gas extraction 
 
Ban on hydraulic 
fracturing 
Actual gas extraction 
project 
 
Yes Yes No 
Number of actors 
included 
 
34 30 23 
Average agreement 0.13 0.19 0.14 
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Table 2: ERGM results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
UK Neuchâtel Bern 
Edges -3.04 -3.60 -3.84 
 
(0.31) (0.42) (0.63) 
Reciprocity -0.48 0.03 0.88 
 (0.54) (0.36) (0.45) 
GWDSP -0.61 -0.37 -0.46 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) 
GWESP 2.08 1.67 1.29 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.33) 
Left-Green match 0.42 0.48 0.02 
 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.29) 
Right-Economic match 0.04 0.36 -0.90 
 
(0.18) (0.20) (0.28) 
Level match - 0.19 0.87 
 - (0.19) (0.45) 
Science incoming 0.07 - - 
 
(0.12) - - 
Power incoming 0.88 0.45 2.60 
 
(0.35) (0.46) (0.90) 
Former collaboration 0.44 1.14 1.16 
 
(0.15) (0.20) (0.30) 
Joint venue participation 0.11 0.42 0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) 
AIC 584.4 554 253.3 
BIC 634.6 601.7 295.6 
Figures in bold indicate statistical significance at a level of p ≤ 0.05 
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Supplementary Material: Actors’ List UK 
Actors in bold answered the survey.
Actor Acronym Full actor name 
Category 1= Political;   
2= Industry; 3= NGO;   
4= Research 
BGS British Geological Survey 4 
CABINET Cabinet 1 
CAMPAIGNRE Campaign to protect Rural England 3 
CENTRICA Centrica 2 
CHATHAM Chatham House 4 
CIA Chemical Industries Association (CIA) 2 
CNG CNG Services Ltd. 4 
CONSERV Conservative party 1 
CUADRILLA Cuadrilla Resources Holding Ltd 2 
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 1 
ECCCOMMITTEE Energy and Climate Change Committee of HoC 1 
ENVAGENCY Environment Agency 1 
FRACKOFF Frack off 3 
FRIENDS Friends of the Earth 3 
GEOLSOCIETY Geological Society 4 
GFRAC Gfrac technologies 4 
GREEN Green party 1 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 1 
IGAS IGas Energy 2 
LABOUR Labour party 1 
LIBERAL Liberal Democrats 1 
NATIONAL  National Grid 2 
NO HOT AIR No Hot Air 3 
OUGO Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO) 1 
OILGASUK Oil & Gas UK 2 
POLICY Policy Exchange 4 
SHELL Shell international Ltd. 2 
ROYALACADEMY The Royal Academy of Engineering 4 
ROYAL SOCIETY The Royal Society  4 
TOTAL TOTAL 2 
TYNDALL Tyndall Centre Manchester 4 
UKERC UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) 4 
UKOOG United Kingdom Onshore Operators Group (UKOOG) 2 
WWF WWF UK 3 
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Supplementary Material: Actors’ List Neuchâtel  
Actor Acronym Full actor name 
Category 1= Political;   
2= Industry; 3= NGO;   
4= Research 
AAFR Friends of Farm Roberts Association  3 
ARE Federal Office for Spatial Development 1 
BAFU Federal Office for the Environment 1 
CC CdF City Council of Chaux-de-Fonds 1 
CC VdT City Council Val-de-Travers 1 
CC VNE City Council of Neuchâtel  1 
CE  Celtique Energie Ltd. 2 
CONE Cantonal Government Neuchâtel 1 
CVdT Collectif Val-de-Travers 3 
DDTE Department of spatial development and the environment 1 
DEAS Department of economy and social activity  1 
ECOFORUM Umbrella organization for the Protection of the Natural 
Heritage of Neuchâtel  
3 
GC  Cantonal Parliament Neuchâtel 1 
GREP  Greenpeace Neuchâtel 3 
PDC Christian Democratic People's Party 1 
PLR FDP. The Liberals 1 
PS Social Democratic Party 1 
POP Swiss Party of Labour 1 
PRNA  Pro Natura Neuchâtel 3 
SCAV Cantonal office of consumption and veterinary  1 
SENE Cantonal office of energy and environment  1 
SPBA Fishers Society of Basse-Areuse  3 
SS Solidarity 1 
SWTP Federal Office of Topography Swisstopo 1 
UDC Swiss People's Party 1 
UNINE Neuchâtel University   4 
VERT Green Party 1 
VL Green Liberal Party 1 
WWF  WWF Neuchâtel 1 
Actors in bold answered the survey.  
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Supplementary Material: Actors’ List Bern 
Actor Acronym Full actor name 
Category 1= Political;   2= 
Industry; 3= NGO;   
4= Research 
AWA Cantonal Water and Waste Authority 1 
ARE Federal Office for Spatial Development 1 
BAFU Federal Office for the Environment  1 
BDP Bourgeois Democratic Party 1 
BVE Department of Construction, Transport and Energy of the 
Canton of Berne 
1 
CVP Christian Democratic People's Party 1 
EVP Evangelical People's Party 1 
EWB Utility company Energy Water Berne 1 
FDP FDP. The Liberals 1 
GEOEN Geo Energy Switzerland 4 
GEOEX Geo Explorers Ltd  2 
GLP Green Liberal Party 1 
GP Green Party 1 
GREP Greenpeace regional group Berne 3 
PRNA Pro Natura Bern 3 
RAPP Municipality Rapperswil BE 1 
SEAG SEAG. Company for Swiss oil and gas 2 
SP Social Democratic Party 1 
STML Stadtholder Agency Mittelland 2 
SVP Swiss People's Party SVP 1 
SWTP Federal Office of Topography swisstopo 1 
THUN City Thun 1 
WWF WWF Bern 3 
Actors in bold answered the survey. 
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Endnotes 
i One exception may be trades unions, which are often left wing on social and economic policies but might support 
economic activities that benefit their members. In fracking, we generally find that trades unions prioritize health 
and safety and local environmental concerns over economic potential. 
ii From the 26 Swiss cantons, there is a potential for unconventional gas extraction in only 6, and only in three, 
Neuchâtel, Bern and Vaud, regulatory action and related policy processes were taking place. We excluded the 
canton of Vaud from this analysis, given that a) we did not want to include two cases (besides Neuchâtel) from the 
French speaking part of Switzerland, which represents only about a fourth of the Swiss population, and b) the 
policy process was still ongoing when data was gathered and the policy output still under debate, resulting in a 
low response rate (below 50%) for this canton. We still ran the same model with the Vaud data, and results are the 
same as in Neuchâtel, without the Left-Green match. 
iii For example, in the case of Neuchâtel, venues consisted of a formal request for an exploration concession by a 
private oil and gas company to the cantonal administration; or a parliamentary interpellation by a cantonal MP; or 
a public mobilization against fracking organized by some parties and green NGOs.   
iv The introduction of the survey included a statement about the nature of the policymaking process, the respective 
time period, the topics that were negotiated and the measures of fracking regulation that were discussed. 
Furthermore, the current status quo was also outlined, and c exploitation concessions, concessions for site 
development, exploration concessions, moratoriums, or bans were presented to actors as possible measures. All 
these elements should make sure that actors had the same decision-making process and the same possible measures 
about how to regulate fracking or not in their region in mind when answering the questions. 
v The exact survey question is illustrated here with the example of Neuchâtel: “Please check all actors (see list in 
Appendix I) with whom your organization mainly agreed upon policy measures to be taken to regulate hydraulic 
fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel (second column). In a next step, please indicate all actors with whom your 
organization mainly disagreed about policy measures to be taken to regulate hydraulic fracturing in the canton of 
Neuchâtel (third column). If there are actors missing, please add them to the bottom of the list and indicate if your 
organization agreed / disagreed with them.”  
vi The MCMC algorithm proceeds as follows: in a given optimization iteration, the sum in the denominator of the 
likelihood function is approximated using a series of networks sampled from the distribution parameterized with 
those parameters that maximized the likelihood using the previous sample of networks. 
vii Note that a model with additional model terms (cyclical triplets, powerful actors outgoing ties, scientific actors 
outgoing ties) yields the substantively same results. Results are also robust to the inclusion of variables measuring 
information exchange between actors. Information exchange and policy agreement between two actors correlate 
(whereas the direction of causality is open to discussion), but the other effects in the models are not affected. 
Taking out the endogenous parameters and / or the former collaboration parameter out yields the substantially 
same results in the UK and the Bern case, but affects the other parameters in the Neuchâtel case (i.e. power and 
level homophily matter instead of ideological homophily). 
viii A low geometrical weighting parameter of  0.1 for both parameters means that two actors are unlikely to have 
a lot of shared partners and avoids model degeneracy (Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Goodreau et al. 2008; Morris 
et al. 2008). 
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ix This reason was mentioned by several economic actors, and some of them even refused to fill in the survey due 
to this very reason. 
x If we use a more restrictive criteria for assessing former collaboration, that is, only reciprocated former 
collaboration, the respective parameter is no longer significant in the case of the UK. 
